> There is one other very important takeaway from disruption: companies that go up-market find it impossible to go back down, and I think this too applies to countries.
There's a lot of talking past each other here. This observation, framed a bit differently, is precisely the argument for radical disruptive change. If there's a structural ratchet mechanism, where outsourcing a particular kind of manufacturing work means the US can never do it effectively again, doesn't every tick of the ratchet pose significant risks?
> If there's a structural ratchet mechanism, where outsourcing a particular kind of manufacturing work means the US can never do it effectively again, doesn't every tick of the ratchet pose significant risks?
Yes, and in an earlier post Ben made that argument and said that the broader conversation on tariffs has been straw manning and wasn't trying to understand where they were coming from. He did more or less agree that the post-ww2 and post-nixon economic setup created this and articulated why it's problematic.
His thesis is just that this approach is wrong, and that it's hard to unpack the reasons because you don't know what to trust: is what the admin says a PR problem, a bad argument, directional or literal, etc.
Here's the older post (the one I shared in this thread was a continuation): https://stratechery.com/2025/trade-tariffs-and-tech/
In which metaphor the thesis would implicitly be that we can't for some reason disassemble the "ratchet" and carefully retract or remove the "pawl," but have to chuck a "lit stick of dynamite" into the "workshop."
No, there is still a lot of work to do before we get close to making this make any sense.
I agree, and the reason I don't support the dynamite is precisely because I think there are less destructive ways to reshore manufacturing if we want to. The author seems to be making the opposite point, that the problem is so intractable the US must not "seek to own supply, but rather control it". (Which is clearly true for some things - it's very silly to have nonzero tariffs on coffee and bananas - but he seems to intend it more broadly than that.)
It isn't especially culpable of Thompson, I think.
If he's not immediately well suited to think through a kind of political times last seen outside living memory, well, who immediately is? He didn't build his reputation instantaneously the first time either, but over years. I just think it may now be more a hindrance than a help, in having established a higher expectation than circumstances may any longer allow reliably living up to for a while at least.
As I say, I don't really hold it against him, even on a professional level. Someone who's consistently wrong in an interpretable way is not of much less value than someone with a string of good calls - maybe more, if the contrarian is strong on theory and the "superpredictor" shows signs of capitalizing on a run of good luck. Which of those he turns out to be if any I suppose we'll find out, and previously having put everything new behind a paywall is questionable, but at the very least I suspect that to keep up with his doings may remain of some interest.